State v. Cooney Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 44547 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
6-22-2017
State v. Cooney Respondent's Brief Dckt. 44547
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Cooney Respondent's Brief Dckt. 44547" (2017). Not Reported. 3619.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/3619
 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 




IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 




JACK J. COONEY, JR., 
 












          NO. 44547 
 
          Nez Perce County Case No.  
          CR-2015-8103 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Cooney failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
declining to place him on probation upon imposing a unified sentence of 10 years, with 
three years fixed, for felony DUI? 
 
 
Cooney Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
 
 A jury found Cooney guilty of felony DUI (prior felony DUI within 15 years) and 
the district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with three years fixed.  (R., 
 2 
pp.164-66.)  Cooney filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.  (R., 
pp.169-72.)   
Cooney asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it ordered his 
unified sentence of 10 years, with three years fixed, into execution rather than placing 
him on probation, in light of the presentence investigator’s recommendation for 
probation with “a lengthy period of local incarceration,” Cooney’s work history and 
community support, and because he “appear[ed] to have done well” (other than 
smoking marijuana) for approximately the first two years of his probationary period for 
his previous felony DUI – until he committed the new felony DUI in this case.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.4-8 (quoting PSI, pp.9-101); PSI, pp.2, 4.)  Cooney has failed to 
establish an abuse of discretion.   
Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Moore, 
131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 
873 P.2d 144 (1994).  A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish 
the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals 
of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.  State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 
621, 628 (2016) (citations omitted).  The district court has the discretion to weigh those 
objectives and give them differing weights when deciding upon the sentence.  Id. at 9, 
368 P.3d at 629; Moore, 131 Idaho at 825, 965 P.2d at 185 (court did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that the objectives of punishment, deterrence and protection of 
 
                                            
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “44547-
State v. Jack J Cooney Jr-Confidential Exhibits to Clerk’s Record.pdf.”   
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society outweighed the need for rehabilitation).  “In deference to the trial judge, this 
Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds 
might differ.”  McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 
Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)). 
A trial court's decision regarding whether imprisonment or probation is 
appropriate is within its discretion.  State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 278, 61 P.3d 632, 
635 (Ct. App. 2002) (citations omitted); I.C. § 19-2601(4).  The goal of probation is to 
foster the probationer's rehabilitation while protecting public safety.  State v. Cheatham, 
159 Idaho 856, ___, 367 P.3d 251, 253 (Ct. App. 2016) (citations omitted).  A decision 
to deny probation will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if it is consistent with the 
criteria articulated in I.C. § 19-2521.  Id. (citing State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567, 650 
P.2d 707, 709 (Ct. App. 1982)).  Pursuant to I.C. § 19-2521(1): 
The court shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a 
crime without imposing sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to 
the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and 
condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that imprisonment is 
appropriate for protection of the public because: 
 
(a)  There is undue risk that during the period of a suspended 
sentence or probation the defendant will commit another crime; or 
 
(b)  The defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be 
provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or 
 
(c)  A lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the 
defendant's crime; or 
 
(d)  Imprisonment will provide appropriate punishment and 
deterrent to the defendant; or 
 
(e)  Imprisonment will provide an appropriate deterrent for other 
persons in the community; or 
 
(f)  The defendant is a multiple offender or professional criminal. 
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I.C. § 19-2521(1).  Additionally, the following grounds, while not controlling the 
discretion of the court, shall be accorded weight in favor of avoiding a sentence of 
imprisonment: 
(a)  The defendant’s criminal conduct neither caused nor 
threatened harm; 
 
(b)  The defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct 
would cause or threaten harm; 
 
(c)  The defendant acted under a strong provocation; 
 
(d)  There were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the 
defendant’s criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense; 
 
(e)  The victim of the defendant’s criminal conduct induced or 
facilitated the commission of the crime; 
 
(f)  The defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim 
of his criminal conduct for the damage or injury that was sustained; 
provided, however, nothing in this section shall prevent the appropriate 
use of imprisonment and restitution in combination; 
 
(g)  The defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal 
activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before 
the commission of the present crime; 
 
(h)  The defendant’s criminal conduct was the result of 
circumstances unlikely to recur; 
 
(i)  The character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that the 
commission of another crime is unlikely. 
 
I.C. § 19-2521(2).  Although a trial court is required to consider the criteria of I.C. § 19-
2521 prior to imposing a sentence of imprisonment, it is not required to recite the 
statutory criteria of I.C. § 19-2521, or its application of the facts to those criteria in 
rendering its decision on probation.  Reber, 138 Idaho at 278, 61 P.3d at 635 (citations 
omitted).   
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The maximum prison sentence for felony DUI (prior felony DUI within 15 years) is 
10 years.  I.C. §§ 18-8005(6), -8005(9).  The district court imposed a unified sentence of 
10 years, with three years fixed, which falls well within the statutory guidelines.  (R., 
pp.164-66.)  On appeal, Cooney contends that the district court “did not act consistently 
with the applicable legal standards when it failed to place him on probation, because it 
did not adequately consider factors falling within the criteria of I.C. § 19-2521,” including 
his work history, community support, and his initial performance while on probation for 
his previous felony DUI, which led to the presentence investigator’s recommendation for 
probation with a lengthy period of local incarceration.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-8.)  
However, Cooney does not explain how his work history, community support, and 
ultimate failure to successfully complete his most recent probationary period fall within 
the criteria of I.C. § 19-2521.  Furthermore, a review of the record demonstrates that the 
district court’s decision to order Cooney’s sentence into execution was, in fact, 
consistent with the criteria articulated in I.C. § 19-2521.   
Cooney is undoubtedly a multiple offender, as the instant offense represents his 
eleventh DUI, which he committed while on probation for a previous felony DUI.  (Tr., 
p.260, Ls.2-3; p.261, Ls.1-2.)  In addition to the DUI’s, he has at least 20 other criminal 
convictions.  (PSI, pp.4, 39-47, 91-94.)  Cooney has continued to make the decision to 
drive while under the influence despite having been afforded an abundance of 
rehabilitative opportunities, including treatment at the Port of Hope, State Hospital 
North, A.A./N.A, Lakeside Recovery, two riders (during which he completed the 
Substance Abuse Program, Thinking Errors, and the Therapeutic Community Program), 
and DUI Court.  (PSI, pp.6, 70, 97, 103, 111, 116.)  Given Cooney’s ongoing criminal 
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offending – particularly with repeated DUI offenses, his failure to rehabilitate despite 
numerous rehabilitative opportunities, and the fact that he committed a new felony DUI 
approximately two years after being placed on probation for a previous felony DUI, it 
cannot be said that the commission of another crime is unlikely or that his criminal 
conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur; to the contrary, there is an 
undue risk that Cooney will commit another crime if released on community supervision, 
and it is clear that imprisonment has become necessary to provide an appropriate 
punishment and deterrent.  It is also apparent that correctional treatment will be 
provided most effectively by Cooney’s commitment to the penitentiary, in light of his 
multiple failed attempts to rehabilitate in the community.    
Furthermore, Cooney’s conduct in the instant offense most certainly threatened 
harm – a fact of which Cooney would have been keenly aware given his lengthy history 
of committing DUI’s.  While driving under the influence presents a danger in and of itself 
due to the resulting impairment to mental and motor skills, Cooney significantly 
increased the potential of causing harm by driving on the wrong side of the road into 
oncoming traffic, requiring an officer to “pull over to avoid a collision.”  (PSI, p.12.)  After 
the officer stopped him, Cooney became uncooperative, cursed at the officer, and, upon 
being arrested, repeatedly attempted to use his elbow to push the officer away while the 
officer was trying to secure him in the patrol vehicle.  (PSI, p.17.)  Once at the jail, 
Cooney refused to exit the patrol vehicle and the officer had to “‘drag him out’” and “put 
him on the ground” until a detention deputy arrived; the two then carried Cooney into the 
jail.  (PSI, p.17.)  Cooney plainly did not act under any provocation and there were no 
grounds to excuse or justify his criminal conduct, as he willingly consumed alcohol and 
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made the decision to endanger the community – yet again – by driving while intoxicated.  
Although Cooney was fortunate enough not to have created a victim in the commission 
of his most recent DUI, a lesser sentence would unquestionably depreciate the 
seriousness of the crime given the hazardous nature of the offense and Cooney’s 
demonstrated willingness to repeatedly place members of the community in harm’s way.   
Although it is unclear how Cooney’s work history, community support, short-lived 
period of probation during which he was not convicted of another crime, or the PSI 
recommendation fall within the criteria set forth in I.C. § 19-2521 in such a way as to 
show that Cooney was a viable candidate for probation, the district court did, in fact, 
articulate its consideration of each of these factors.  (See Tr., p.263, Ls.3-21.)  
Moreover, in setting forth its reasons for determining that probation was not appropriate 
in this case, the court addressed, inter alia, the dangerous nature of the offense, the 
continuous course of conduct that renders Cooney a multiple offender, his undue risk to 
reoffend if placed on probation, his failure to rehabilitate via community-based 
treatment, and the need for a prison sentence to satisfy the goals of punishment and 
deterrence and to protect society.  (Tr., p.262, L.5 – p.266, L.15.)  The state submits 
that Cooney has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set 
forth in the attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing transcript, which the state adopts 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Cooney’s conviction and 
sentence. 
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      Deputy Attorney General 
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rea d that , I don ' t wan t to was te the Court ' s time . 
I still fee l the same way . I wou l d just be 
reiterating that to you , sir, and I real ly don ' t 
4 want to waste the Cour t's time . 
5 THE COURT : Well , I never considered my 
6 time spent with you wasted , Mr . Cooney , I t hought 
2 62 
7 th ings were go ing real ly well for you eventually . So 
8 I was r e a l d i sappointed t o have you bac k here 
9 cha rged with another offense. That ma tter we n t to 
10 tr i al and you we re convict ed upon a jury trial in 
11 tha t cas e , and then I of cou r se you didn 't 







the circumstances of how it came about , that rea lly 
became apparent t o me when you made your statement 
to the presentence investigator . 
If this was the first time that you had 
used a lcoho l in tha t long of period of time , then 
tha t' s e x tremely unfortunat e . Dur ing the course of 
19 time when you h ave been on probation , you h a d to 
20 have been offered a lcohol on other occas ions and 
21 evidently turned it d own . So on th i s particula r 
22 occasion when somebody that you d escribe as a 
23 friend, I don't know how good a friend if they know 
24 your history and know what you are i nvolved in , that 
25 they would o ffer you alcohol , I don ' t know how you 
r 
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1 desc ri be some body t hat offers you alcohol as a 
2 f riend , because they weren 't d oing you any favors. 
3 And then you made the decision to accept i t, and 
4 af ter all this -- after a ll th i s time to put 
5 yourse l f at risk really really troubl es me because I 
6 think you made some pre tty sub stantia l progress . I 
7 think you were pretty well regarded wi t h i n the 
8 recovery communi t y for what you had kind of 
9 accomplished and some chang es t hat you had made. 




business . I think p eop l e really value your paint i ng 
services . We know some of the same people . Mr . 
is sitting i n the courtroom here to support you . 
Lang 
I 
14 have known John Lang for a long t i me . I know how he 
15 regards y ou and he values you for the services you 
16 have provi ded to h i s bus i ness . 
17 But I a l so have t o say tha t Ms . Smi t h ' s 
18 right , I was su r p r ised when I got the PS I 
19 recommendation too because you have shown th i s 
20 patte r n ove r t he course of decades now of having DUI 
21 offenses . And this one , I don' t know how much you 
22 had to drink , if it was only a bee r or two , I d on ' t 
23 know if you were if you helped you r sel f by 
24 re f using the BAC or not , I only have wh at you 
25 expla i n e d to me as far as those circumstances , bu t 






espec ia l ly tha t ' s just tremendously bad judgment to 
do that and then get behind the wheel of a car aga i n 
knowing what all you have gone through with the 
4 various offenses that you have had , the chances tha t 
5 you have had , the fact that you were on probation o n 
6 t he pr i or felony DUI at t his poin t in t ime. 
7 I t's tough really in a situat i on , 
8 Mr . Cooney , to kind of ba l ance out what ' s necessary 
9 and app r opriate for you , but I th ink I also have to 
10 consider , as Ms . Smith has said , my primary 










obliga t ion is to soc iety in t h i s circums tance and 
try to find some sentence in this case that I think 
is appropr i ate . And I think given your history and 
t he number of treatment opportunities that y ou have 
had, that this really does need to become more of a 
p unishment sentence than a rehabilitation one , more 
of a protection of society and deterrence case than 
a rehabilitation one . If I o n l y wanted to serve the 
goal of rehabi litation , I probably would put you 





past ; but unfortunately where you have commit t e d an 
offen se here tha t has put the community at ris k and 
it's a pattern continuous cour se of conduct for 
you for over a numb e r o f years , I don ' t feel I can 
APPENDIX A – Page 4 
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1 go along with the recommendation in the presentence 
2 
3 
investigation report in this case. I just can ' t . 
So I think some sentence of punishment i s 
4 appropriate in this case , but I am not prepared to 






I possibly could in this s i tuation , Mr . Cooney . 
have seen you capable of too much good things . I 
have a l so seen you capable of , of course , the bad 
things . 
I 
So in t his s i tua t ion , Mr . Cooney , I really 
11 feel that my only option is a s entence of 
1 2 incarcera t ion here and the nex t decision then is how 
13 long t hat needs t o be . I t h i nk certainly the re needs 
14 to be a lengthy period o f p o t ential supervision for 
15 you. That worked for some period of time wi th me 
16 a f ter you f inished the rider progra m, but ul tima tely 
17 when left on your own , you made this very bad 
18 decision that led to a commission of an additional 
19 
20 
o f fense. 
On the prior offense , Mr . Cooney , I had 
21 previously suspended a sentence of not less than two 
22 and not more than five years in the c ustody of the 
23 Idaho State Board of Corrections , as t o that 
24 probation matter , I am revoking and imposing t hat 
25 t wo t o five year sentence in the custody of t he 
r 




Idaho State Boa r d of Corrections. 
On the new charge based upon the jury ' s 
guilty verdict in this case, I find that you are 
266 
4 guilty of that offense , and you are hereby sentenced 
5 in that matter to the custody of Idaho S t ate Board 
6 of Corre ctions f or a period of not l ess than three 
7 and not more than ten years , cons i sting o f a mi n i mum 
8 per i od of confinement of three years during which 
9 would you not be e l igible for credit, discharge or 
10 other reduct ion of sen t ence fo r good conduct, 
11 subsequent indeterminate period of seven years f o r a 
12 tota l of ten . It would be my order that those 
13 sentences would be served concur r en t l y. So real l y 
14 it ' s the second sentence that you are go i ng to be 
15 mos t working t owa r ds, Mr . Cooney. 
16 You are going to be given credi t for the 
17 time that you have been in custody since I have 
18 remanded you to custody fol l owing the compl etion of 
19 the ju ry verdict , and that will be towards the 
20 minimum p eriod of confinement in this matter . 
21 I n addition to t hat , I am , of course , 
22 imposing court costs in this matte r . Also I ' m 
23 entering an order suspending your driv i ng privil ege s 
24 for t he period of two years follo wing your release 
25 from incarceration i n this matter as i s required 
t 
